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How does international law require States acting outside their own territories 
to treat refugees and other persons fleeing harm in their countries?1 This 
question has assumed increasing contemporary relevance in light of heightened 
externalised border controls, such as attempts by States to interdict migrant 
boats on the high seas in the Mediterranean (see, for instance Moreno-Lax 
2012). However, the issue also arises in other contemporary scenarios, such as 
where persons seek protection in diplomatic or consular premises, where one 
State militarily occupies the territory of another, and where a State sets up a 
system for the extraterritorial processing of asylum claims. 
This short analysis addresses the non-refoulement aspect of this 
extraterritoriality problem, i.e. protection against enforced removal to a 
territory where the person fears harm by a State acting outside its own territory. 
Inspired by the human rights focus of the volume overall, the chapter draws 
on current research by the author in order to examine this ever-topical concern 
against recent advances in the field of international human rights law. It not 
only confirms the view that the non-refoulement rule in human rights law applies 
extraterritorially, but also concludes that the resulting procedural implications 
should be taken seriously both for human rights law and for refugee law.
Development of human rights doctrine on ‘extraterritoriality’
The many human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations (UN) and 
regional organisations offer a patchwork of different legal provisions for the 
protection of human rights by contracting States. Rather than reprise the basic 
elements of this framework, as the basis for subsequent discussion, the present 
1 This intriguing question was recently raised by Ralph Wilde in his seminar on ‘The 
Extraterritorial Application of the Non-refoulement Obligation in International 
Human Rights Law’, 5th International Refugee Law Seminar Series, Refugee Law 
Initiative, School of Advanced Study, University of London. 5 May 2015. 
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section instead outlines two doctrinal advances concerning extraterritoriality in 
human rights law: the jurisdiction of States acting extraterritorially (Wilde 2003); 
and the prohibition of refoulement to human rights violations in another territory.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction of States
International treaties governing human rights usually require that a contracting 
State respect and ensure these rights for persons subject to their territorial 
jurisdiction, i.e. who are present on its territory. However, students on the 
MA in Human Rights who have taken the law module in recent years will (or 
should!) be familiar with the idea that these same States will also sometimes 
be required to respect and/or ensure the human rights of individuals outside 
their territory. Indeed, it seems that human rights obligations arise where a 
State exercises certain forms of authority – or ‘jurisdiction’ – outside its own 
territory. This could be on the territory of another State or outside territory 
claimed by any State (e.g. on the high seas). 
The famous judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Al-
Skeini and Others v. UK identifies some scenarios in which such ‘extraterritorial’ 
jurisdiction exists. Firstly, where a State exercises effective control over a zone 
outside its national territory, whether as a consequence of lawful or unlawful 
military action, then it is apparently required to guarantee the full gamut of 
treaty rights to persons in that zone.2 Secondly, where State officials exercise 
control and authority over an individual – whether through diplomatic/ 
consular acts or through the use of force – then this form of jurisdiction requires 
that the State guarantee the rights pertinent to the situation of that individual. 
‘In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided and tailored”’.3 
This rationale is largely in line with the emerging doctrine being developed 
by other international courts and treaty body mechanisms. It strongly suggests 
that human rights obligations – or at least in relation to certain rights – will 
remain applicable to States in certain scenarios where certain concrete acts by 
their agents take place, or produce effects, extraterritorially. 
Refoulement to extraterritorial human rights violations
The other main area in which international human rights law has developed 
doctrinally in order to address issues of extraterritoriality is in relation to 
the principle of ‘non-refoulement’. Deriving originally from refugee law, this 
principle prohibits a State from removing an alien (foreigner) from its territory 
where this would result in serious harm to the alien outside that territory. 
However, since the 1980s, this principle has been developed considerably by 
international human rights law.
2 Al-Skeini and Others v. UK, paras 133–7.
3 Ibid., paras 138–40.
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In human rights law, the non-refoulement principle is derived principally from 
the core prohibition on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The idea is that if it is illegal for a State to torture a person under its own jurisdiction, 
then equally it must be prohibited to remove him/her to another territory where s/
he would be tortured. The principle finds concrete expression, inter alia, in Article 
3 of the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and it has been read into most 
other treaties that prohibit torture etc. in more general terms.4
The human rights non-refoulement principle has a strong speculative 
aspect, i.e. it is engaged by the envisaged risk extraterritorially. As such, it 
does not establish the removing State’s responsibility for acts committed by 
others outside its territory. Rather, where the risk of serious abuse awaits the 
alien at the other end, the principle typifies the act of removal – initiated on 
the territory of the removing State – as ‘degrading’ or ‘inhumane’.5 For this 
reason, even where the abuse overseas does not take the specific form of torture 
but rather interference with other rights (e.g. fair trial), the non-refoulement 
principle can prevent removal where the abuse of other rights is ‘flagrant’.6 
Non-refoulement in extraterritorial contexts
Human rights law frames extraterritorial considerations according to two 
distinct rationales, as shown above. In the context of refoulement, the removing 
State’s responsibility is engaged by its own actions on its territory albeit in 
light of the potential eventual consequences extraterritorially. Where a State 
acts outside its territory, human rights obligations bite directly wherever 
jurisdiction is exercised. What, though, is the legal position where both 
rationales apply simultaneously, i.e. where a State acting extraterritorially is 
faced with a situation of potential refoulement?
Applicability of non-refoulement principle extraterritorially?
The doctrinal analysis above shows that States acting extraterritorially will 
sometimes be exercising jurisdiction in a manner constitutive of human rights 
obligations. The question here is whether those obligations encompass the non-
refoulement principle. 
4 Thus, the European Court of Human Rights reads the principle into Article 3 of 
the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights in Soering v. UK; the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights reads it into Article 5 of the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights in its Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 on Rights and 
Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of International 
Protection; and the Human Rights Committee reads it into Article 7 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Chitat Ng v. Canada.
5 See the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. UK, para. 91. 
6 See the European Court of Human Rights in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. UK, paras. 
258–85. 
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS116
In principle, in the first Al-Skeini scenario of a State exerting effective 
control over a zone of another State’s territory, non-refoulement should remain 
applicable alongside other human rights guarantees. Thus, in the example 
of military occupation, human rights law presumably should prevent an 
occupying State from removing a person from occupied territory where the 
risk of human rights abuse at the other end exists.7 
Less straightforward is the second Al-Skeini scenario of the State agent(s) 
exerting control and authority over an individual extraterritorially. In contrast 
to the first scenario, the State agent(s) is/are acting in a context where the 
wider apparatus of their own State is not present and in control. We are thus 
much less likely to be talking about situations involving the ‘removal of aliens’ 
in relation to which much of the human rights non-refoulement doctrine has 
been developed. A broader spectrum of scenarios exists in which the principle 
of non-refoulement is, in the words of the Al-Skeini judgment, more or less 
relevant to the situation of that individual.
Some of these scenarios will have clear and direct parallels with the 
established non-refoulement removal paradigm. This is the case, for instance, 
where a State official attempts to transfer an individual under his/her power 
to another country (whether by kidnap or formal procedure) where the risk 
of harm exists. A similar scenario may be where a State official on a boat turns 
back, or escorts back, a boat full of migrants encountered on the open sea to 
a territory where they face harm. In these scenarios, the direct relationship 
between the act of the State agent and exposure to envisaged harm in another 
territory should bring the non-refoulement principle into play.8
However, in other scenarios, it may be less easy to establish a sufficiently 
proximate link between the extraterritorial official act and the envisaged harm 
necessary to engage the non-refoulement principle. If so, then we may see greater 
jurisprudential development around the legal threshold for such proximity 
in the future. The challenge will be particularly acute in cases that do not 
involve use of force against a person by a State agent but rather revolve around 
diplomatic or consular acts. It will be interesting to see the extent to which 
such developments redraw the international law parameters of diplomatic 
asylum, i.e. temporary asylum granted on diplomatic premises (Noll 2005). 
7 Even if the laws of war apply simultaneously as lex specialis, and thus modify certain 
human rights obligations, the two bodies of law largely march in line in prohibiting 
refoulement. For a more detailed analysis of the position under the laws of war, see 
Cantor (2014).
8 This has been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in cases such as, 
respectively, Öcalan v. Turkey and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. 
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Procedural implications of the applicability of the non-refoulement 
principle? 
One element that is missing from much of the discussion surrounding these 
themes is the question of whether, or to what extent, procedural guarantees 
apply in this extraterritorial context. In other words, does human rights law 
require that certain procedural or due process guarantees must be observed by 
State agents acting outside their territory when deciding whether the principle 
of non-refoulement applies to a particular situation or individual? From an 
administrative perspective, this processual aspect is crucial since it is not usually 
apparent from a quick glance whether or not any individual should benefit 
from the non-refoulement rule, but rather requires deeper investigation of their 
particular circumstances.
Where potential refoulement arises in the removal context on a State’s own 
territory, international human rights jurisprudence has increasingly adopted 
the consensus that the removal decision must be taken in line with due process 
guarantees (Cantor 2015). The various international human rights systems 
provide different legal bases and rationales for this development. Nonetheless, 
where the risk of refoulement is in issue, all generally require, inter alia, that 
the alien: has access to decision-making by a ‘competent’ national authority; 
independent, individual, rigorous and prompt scrutiny of the issue; automatic 
suspensive effect of the removal measure; a reasoned decision; and often the 
opportunity to challenge it at a higher instance, usually the national courts. 
There is little doubt that these guarantees would apply in the first Al-Skeini 
scenario, where the State effectively continues to act as a State albeit on another 
State’s territory. However, the implications are likely to be much more far-
reaching in the second Al-Skeini scenario where the agent(s) of the State acting 
outside its territory exercise control and authority over an individual. Indeed, 
they would need either to be, or to have recourse to, authorities competent 
to evaluate these cases and take such decisions. Moreover, the requirement to 
do so in accordance with due process standards entails in itself access to a 
considerable bureaucratic (and also likely judicial) infrastructure.
For instance, where boats of migrants are intercepted and pushed back on 
the high seas, do these human rights guarantees require a proper decision-
making process for any passengers who express or reasonably may be believed 
to have a fear of harm? In other words, does the full gamut of procedural 
guarantees applicable to refoulement in the context of removal apply? Recent 
case-law from the European Court of Human Rights suggests this question is to 
be answered in the affirmative, holding that the migrants’ right to an effective 
remedy was breached by the fact that they had ‘no access to a procedure to 
identify them and to assess their personal circumstances’ before they were 
directed back to a territory where they faced possible harm.9 
9 See Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, esp. paras. 196–207.
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If correct, then in scenarios where the extraterritorial act of a State agent 
gives rise to an envisaged future risk of harm sufficient to engage the non-
refoulement rule, it would appear that relatively extensive procedural obligations 
materialise requiring that the risk to be assessed and determined in accordance 
with due process standards. In the migrant boat example, this would suggest 
that access to such facilities must be provided, whether on the intercepting boat 
or by disembarkation at a territory where such procedures are available. From 
the human rights perspective, the exercise of State authority over a person 
brings with it certain inescapable human rights obligations. 
Conclusions: intersections between human rights and refugee law
This brief analysis of extraterritoriality shows that State obligations under 
international human rights law do not stop at its borders nor are they blind to 
events beyond them. Rather, the jurisprudence requires a State to take account 
of the human rights implications of expelling or removing an alien across 
such borders and to comply with human rights obligations when it exercises 
jurisdiction beyond those borders. Both requirements are concerned with 
extraterritoriality but from different standpoints and thus they apply different 
rationales. 
Whereas refugee law pioneered the development of the non-refoulement 
principle, it is largely silent on whether this principle and other refugee 
law obligations apply when States act beyond their own borders. Indeed, 
this ambivalence is amply demonstrated in one of the few such cases to be 
decided on a refugee law basis before the courts: in a 1993 decision in Sale, the 
United States (US) Supreme Court held by a majority that refugee law treaty 
obligations did not apply when the US interdicted boats from Haiti on the 
high seas. Although the decision is much criticised, still it stands against the 
lack of any international tribunal for refugee law where its rationale might be 
challenged.
By contrast, recent jurisprudential developments in international human 
rights law strongly suggest that a State acting outside its own territory remains 
bound by the human rights version of the non-refoulement principle. However, 
of perhaps greater significance than the mere applicability of this principle of 
extraterritoriality are the far-reaching procedural implications that this entails, 
particularly in light of the recent jurisprudential advances in the human rights 
field confirming the existence of robust due process standards in cases where 
non-refoulement may be in issue. In brief, it would seem that the provision of 
access to proper procedures for making such determination is obligatory. 
These findings are significant not only in their own right but also for how 
they bolster refugee law. Thus, in some human rights systems, the relevant 
procedural standards also require that refugee status be determined in 
accordance with the same due process guarantees. In other words, at least for 
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people outside their country and in the hands of a State acting extraterritorially, 
the duty to determine human rights refoulement risk marches hand-in-hand 
with a requirement to determine refugee status. Alternatively, access to 
protection against refoulement on human rights grounds can serve as a backstop 
to refugee status, given the degree of overlap between the two. 
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